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Abstract 
We employ a novel methodology for the study of the characteristics of successful European 
Union cohesion projects. We first estimated ‘unexplained economic growth’ by controlling 
for the influence of various region-specific factors, and then analysed its relationship with 
about two dozen cohesion project characteristics. We found that the best-performing 
regions have on average projects with longer durations, more inter-regional focus, lower 
national co-financing, more national (as opposed to regional and local) management, higher 
proportions of private or non-profit participants among the beneficiaries and higher levels 
of funding from the Cohesion Fund. No clear patterns emerged concerning the sector of 
intervention. 
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A key objective of the European Union is to strengthen regional cohesion by addressing 
development disparities, particularly by targeting less-favoured regions1. The EU allocated 
about €367 billion, 34 percent of its total budget, to cohesion policy objectives in the 2014-
2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). These funds have co-financed (along with 
national financing) economic development programmes drawn up by different regions. 
Programmes must demonstrate how they contribute to a broad range of objectives, from 
research and development activities in small and medium-sized enterprises, to public 
administration and social inclusion. 
We have identified more than 1,000 papers analysing EU cohesion policy, dealing with 
various aspects of effectiveness, convergence, inequality, governance and many other 
topics. The academic literature on the effectiveness of the EU cohesion policy is 
inconclusive: some studies find positive long-term impacts, others find positive but only 
short-term impacts, while others find no or even negative impacts. This range of results 
arises from major complicating factors, related to complex local environments, the diversity 
of policy interventions beyond cohesion policy, varying time frames, cross-regional spillover 
effects, lack of appropriate data for the analysis and various econometric problems and 
related estimation biases.  
Despite the large number of studies assessing various aspects of cohesion policy, the 
literature that analyses programme or project characteristics is very scarce, not least 
because of difficulties in accessing related data. The main contribution of this paper to the 
literature is the study of the characteristics of successful cohesion programmes and 
projects. We consider around two-dozen project characteristics, which include financial, 
managerial and operational aspects of the projects, as well as the sector of intervention and 
whether private-sector involvement is influential. The rate of national co-financing might 
play a role. Among this list, some earlier papers analysed the sector of intervention, but we 
are not aware of papers scrutinising the project characteristics we consider.  
 
 
1 Art. 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008E174. 
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We employ a novel methodology which has two main parts. First, we use a quantitative 
econometric model to identify the EU regions that have performed best and worst in terms 
of GDP growth per capita at regional level, relative to other similar regions, by controlling 
for various initial conditions, but not controlling for potentially endogenous cohesion policy 
variables. Clearly, GDP growth is not the only goal of cohesion policy. Several programmes 
aim to preserve the environment, foster urban development or promote social inclusion. 
Such programmes might not lead to immediate upticks in economic growth. However, most 
cohesion funding is spent on less-developed regions, with the overarching goal of fostering 
their development. Therefore, while economic convergence is not the only objective, it 
remains the most important objective of cohesion policy.  
Because of the difficulties in identifying the causal impact of cohesion policy, our 
econometric model is not designed to measure the impact of cohesion policy per se, but to 
sort regions according to their growth performance. Good growth performance might, or 
might not, be related to cohesion policy and there could also be several indirect channels. 
For example, cohesion policy can improve infrastructure, which, in combination with state 
aid from the government of the country, attracts foreign direct investment, ultimately 
leading to faster growth, higher employment and increases in GDP per capita. The 
interaction of cohesion policy with other EU and national policies, and with various other 
factors, makes it practically impossible to draw causal conclusions about cohesion policy and 
to disentangle its various direct and indirect channels from other drivers of growth, as our 
literature survey also revealed. 
However, one can still glean insights by comparing the characteristics of EU cohesion 
projects in the best and worst performing regions, in order to highlight aspects that 
differentiate them from each other. Thus, the second main part of our methodology 
systematically analyses the characteristics of cohesion projects carried out in the best and 
worst performing regions.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature and highlights 
the difficulties in drawing causal conclusions about EU cohesion policy. Section 3 estimates 
conditional convergence models and ranks regions according to their growth performance 
in 2003-2017, by controlling for the influence of various region-specific factors. Section 4 
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analyses the relationship between growth performance and about two dozen cohesion 
project-specific characteristics. Section 5 concludes by drawing out the implications for 
cohesion policy reform from our empirical analysis. The annex details our dataset. 
 
2 The difficulty of estimating the causal impact of cohesion policy 
There is an extensive literature on cohesion policy. We have identified more than 1,000 
papers dealing with various aspects of effectiveness, convergence, inequality, governance 
and many other issues. In addition to our own review of a couple of dozen works, we drew 
on earlier literature surveys by Hagen and Hohl (2009), Marzinotto (2012), Pieńkowski and 
Berkowitz (2015) and Crescenzi and Giua (2017). From these surveys and from our literature 
review, mixed results emerge in terms of the effectiveness of cohesion policy. Some studies 
show varied results for different countries and regions – either long-term positive impacts 
or short-term impacts which reverse when the inflow of funds stops. Some studies found no 
significant impact on regional growth, or even a negative impact.  
Such a range of results is generally attributed to different methodologies, variables, datasets 
used in the regressions and different time periods covered by the analyses. But there are 
more fundamental issues too.  
Cohesion policy works in very different local economic and social contexts, as highlighted by 
Crescenzi and Giua (2017) and Berkowitz et al (2020). It operates in an environment subject 
to a multiplicity of measures and multiplicity of national, regional and local rules and 
systems. The separation of the impact of EU spending from the impact of national spending 
presents an additional difficulty. Projects have varying time frames, and several projects are 
ongoing at the same time, making it more difficult to identify the impacts. Spillovers across 
regions add further complications. For example, EU spending in one particular region can 
have positive impacts on neighbouring regions, because of their close economic ties. 
Approaches used to estimate the impact of cohesion policy suffer from various drawbacks. 
Macroeconomic model simulations can only reflect the assumptions on which they are 
based. For example, if it is assumed that cohesion policy boosts physical capital, human 
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capital and productivity, and it is assumed that increases in these boost growth, it is easy to 
conclude that cohesion spending is good for growth. Studies reliant on counterfactual 
scenarios find it extremely difficult to establish reasonable counterfactual scenarios. And 
empirical estimates suffer from various data and econometric estimation problems.  
The impact of cohesion policy is influenced by various institutional and structural regional 
factors (including degree of decentralisation, the presence of national supportive 
institutions, trust, openness, lack of corrupt practices, geographical position and initial 
conditions), political economic factors (including whether the country has a federal or 
decentralised system, the political situation within the country and the region, and 
relationships between various layers of government), as well as the interaction between 
cohesion policy and other (EU and national) policies. However, for many of these factors, 
proper variables are not available. 
Empirical estimates also suffer from the simultaneity (or endogeneity) bias, which occurs 
when one or more explanatory variables (for example, cohesion spending and investments) 
are endogenously determined with the explained variable (for example, economic growth) 
and the endogeneity is not properly dealt with. Hagen and Hohl (2009) suggested four 
reasons why this could be the case: (1) reverse causality, since the EU’s cohesion policy 
conditionality is likely to be linked to the growth rate of the region that benefits from the 
cohesion funding; (2) there can be unobserved or omitted variables such as a spillover effect 
where a neighbouring region can be affected by cohesion policy funding; (3) Nickell bias, 
which occurs when a fixed-effects econometric model is applied to a dynamic setup; (4) 
measurement errors, because while cohesion funding data is available at regional level, 
many observed variables are only available at national level or are not available at all. 
Berkowitz et al (2020) also draw the attention to the influence of cohesion policy on 
variables which are typically used control variables (such as private investment and 
educational attainment), in which case these controls already include an impact from 
cohesion policy. 
A further econometric problem is that it is not clear which specification to use and which 
functional form is appropriate. Since cohesion policy could impact outcomes with a time lag, 
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the specification of dynamic impacts creates further complications. All these factors make 
attempts to estimate the causal impact of cohesion policy dubious. 
In their seminal work, Bachtler et al (2013, nicely summarised by Bachtler et al, 2017), did 
not aim to establish a causal link between cohesion policy and economic growth, but aimed 
to answer the questions: (1) whether the programmes implemented by the regions 
achieved what they were designed to do; and (2) whether what they achieved dealt with the 
needs of the regions (as identified at the start of the process). Their methodology was based 
on case studies. Their main conclusion was that cohesion policy suffered from a lack of 
conceptual thinking and strategic justification for programmes. Objectives were neither 
specific nor measurable. There were various deficiencies in most areas of management. 
They argued that there have been some improvements in these areas, but progress in 
addressing these problems has been slow and inconsistent, and some regions experienced a 
deterioration of implementation quality during the 2007-2013 period. 
Therefore, because of the general and method-specific problems, as well as the more 
qualitative conclusions of Bachtler et al (2013, 2017), it is not possible to draw an overall 
conclusion from the large literature, beyond perhaps some plausible issues, such as the 
importance of good governance, geographical characteristics, initial endowments of the 
region or the economic structure of regions. 
 
3 Conditional convergence and unexplained economic growth 
Due to the substantial identification issues when conducting econometric analyses to assess 
the causal impact of cohesion policy on economic outcomes, we do not employ any existing 
methodology from the literature but develop a novel methodology, while controlling for 
various region-specific factors. Our methodology consists of two steps. First, we identify 
regions with the best and the worst GDP growth performance, based on a wide range of 
regional factors, which is the scope of this section. Second, in the next section we study if 
various EU cohesion project characteristics differ between the best and the worst 
performers. 
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3.1 Convergence regressions 
In order to classify the best and worst performing regions, we ran cross-section regressions 
of the growth rate of GDP per capita at PPS (purchasing power standards) between 2003 
and 2017 on a number of fundamentals, which, according to classic economic theory, should 
explain the different growth paths. Intentionally, we do not include variables related to 
cohesion policy. The regression we estimate: 
(1)  𝑙𝑜𝑔⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃2017,𝑖) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔⁡(𝐺𝐷𝑃2003,𝑖) = ⁡𝛼 + ⁡𝛽 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺𝐷𝑃2003,𝑖) ⁡+⁡𝜸𝒙𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝐺𝐷𝑃t,𝑖 is the level of GDP per capita at PPS in region i in year t, vector 𝒙𝒊 includes 
various region-specific control variables, 𝑁 is the number of regions, 𝛼, 𝛽 and 𝜸 are 
parameters to be estimated, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
Eurostat publishes per-capita GDP at current market prices measured at purchasing power 
standards that we use in our benchmark model. This means that the change in this indicator 
from 2003 to 2017 includes the same EU-wide inflation over this period (as reflected in the 
change of EU-wide purchasing power standards) for every region, beyond region-specific 
real growth. Ideally, per-capita GDP at constant market prices measured at purchasing 
power standards would be the best indicator, but unfortunately it is not available. However, 
for NUTS-2 (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics)2 regions, Eurostat publishes 
gross value added (GVA) at constant basic prices. For international growth comparison, GDP 
at market prices is a preferable indicator to GVA at basic prices. Nevertheless, as a 
robustness test, we use the change in per-capita GVA at constant prices as an alternative 
dependent variable: estimation results are very similar (see details in the annex), though the 
adjusted R2 of the regression is higher (0.57) when we use GDP than when we use GVA 
(0.37) as the dependent variable. 
An important question is whether we use a pure cross-section regression spanning the 
whole period from 2003 to 2017, or if we divide this period into certain sub-periods and 
adopt a panel data model. We decided to use the cross-section specification to reflect long-
 
2 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing up 
the economic territory of the EU. See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background. It has three levels: 
NUTS-1: major socio-economic regions; NUTS-2: basic regions; NUTS-3: small regions. 
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run developments. The use of sub-samples for a panel framework would be burdened by 
the impact of the characteristics of specific periods, such as the unsustainable pre-crisis 
economic boom in a number of EU countries, the impact of global and European financial 
crises, and the more recent recovery. Since these three phases of economic performance 
had different durations and magnitudes across the EU, inserting time effects into a panel 
regression would have not been sufficient to control for them properly. We therefore 
decided to run cross-section regressions in this paper. 
In order to reduce endogeneity problems in our regression, we abstain from controlling for 
factors contemporaneous to the period of growth analysed – 2003 through 2017. There is 
only one exception: the earliest regional institutional quality data we used is available for 
2010. Thereby, we implicitly assume that neither economic growth from 2003-2010, nor 
cohesion policy during this period influenced institutional quality. 
Considering economic theory and the time horizon of our dependent variable (growth from 
2003 to 2017), we include the following explanatory variables in our regressions: 
The logarithm of initial level of GDP per capita at PPS in 2003: the baseline neoclassical 
growth model states that regions with lower income levels are expected to grow faster 
(Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). Less-advanced areas, with lower capital per output ratios, 
should enjoy relatively higher marginal productivity of production factors, thereby 
advancing towards their long-run GDP per capita equilibrium levels.  
The capital/output ratio in 2003 (measured in percent): a higher proportion of capital over 
output, all other things being equal, suggests that the economy is at a more advanced stage 
of development and closer to its steady-state growth rate. 
The growth in population between 2000 and 2003 (measured as percent change): ceteris 
paribus, higher population growth should imply a lower capital per worker ratio and lower 
long-term GDP per capita. 
Employment in the services sector in 2003 (measured as percent of total employment): 
ceteris paribus, regions with a higher share of employees who work neither in agriculture 
nor in manufacturing should be more advanced and closer to the technological frontier. In 
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the context of cohesion policy, Percoco (2017) demonstrated that regions with a below-
mean level of services presented a higher growth rate than did above-mean regions. 
Population density in 2003 (measured as 10,000 people per square kilometre): ceteris 
paribus, urban regions where population density is higher should be more conducive to 
innovation activities and productivity growth. 
Quality of government in 2010 (measured in the range from zero to one): the literature has 
emphasised the importance of effective, impartial and transparent institutions in enabling 
sustainable and sizeable economic growth. For cohesion policy in particular, the analysis of 
Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) underline the importance of government quality both 
as a direct determinant of economic growth as well as a moderator of the efficiency of 
Structural and Cohesion Funds expenditure. As the index of regional government quality 
from Charron et al (2014) is available only for 2010, 2013 and 2017, we use 2010 values. As 
highlighted above, the use of 2010 values as an explanatory variable implies the assumption 
that neither economic growth, nor cohesion policy, were able to substantially change the 
quality of government from 2003-2010. Since the quality of government is a rather 
persistent variable, this assumption might not be overly restrictive. 
Different measures of human capital and of innovation: (i) percentage of the population 
aged 25-64 with tertiary education in 2003; and (ii) percentage of employment in R&D 
activities in 2003. The higher the share of highly educated workers, the larger the ratio of 
human capital per worker in the economy, and therefore the higher the level of expected 
steady-state GDP per capita (Mankiw et al, 1992). 
3.2 Data sources 
Eurostat is the largest provider of data for our analysis, as its regional database contains a 
number of useful indicators at NUTS-1, NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 levels. We collected NUTS-2 and 
NUTS-3 statistics where available. We used data from several Eurostat databases: (i) 
regional economic accounts, (ii) regional demographic statistics, (iii) regional education 
statistics, (iv) regional science and technology statistics, (v) regional business demography, 
(vi) regional labour market statistics. We also include a Quality of Government Index at 
NUTS-2 level developed by Charron et al (2014), which is based on a large citizen survey in 
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which respondents were asked about perceptions and experiences of public-sector 
corruption, along with the extent to which citizens believe various public services are 
impartially allocated and of good quality.  
As a novelty, we create a variable on the capital to output ratio at NUTS-2 level. Data on 
capital/output ratio is available at the country level from the AMECO dataset. We allocate 
by region the national stock of capital in 2003 based on statistics on gross fixed capital 
formation at NUTS-2 level in 1995-2003. Next, we divide the resulting figures by each NUTS-
2 region’s output to obtain regional capital/output ratios. Since investment is not available 
at the NUTS-3 level, we cannot do the same exercise for NUTS-3 regions. Thus, for the 
NUTS-3 regressions, we use the same NUTS-2 capital/output ratio for each NUTS-3 region 
that belongs to a particular NUTS-2 region. 
At times, we constructed occasionally missing data at the regional level in a sensible way. 
Our data sources and adjustments are detailed in the annex. 
3.3 Estimation results 
We proceeded step-by-step, gradually integrating different factors that might potentially 
explain economic growth. We ran our regressions using both NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 level data 
and found rather similar results. While most of the variables had statistically significant 
estimates using both levels of regional aggregation, NUTS-3 estimates were even more 
significant in a statistical sense, possibly because of the much larger number of 
observations. Table 1 reports the results of selected specifications. 
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Table 1: Conditional convergence analysis 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: The dependent variable is GDP per capita at PPS growth in 2003-
17. Huber-White-Hinkley heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Bold 
estimates are statistically significant at 1 percent level, an estimate in italics is statistically significant 
at 2 percent level. 
 
All independent variables included exhibit the sign we would expect according to economic 
theory. All other things being equal, growth in GDP per capita from 2003 to 2017 was (i) 
lower for countries with higher initial levels of PPS GDP per capita; (ii) decreasing in the 
starting level of capital to output ratio; (iii) decreasing in the initial share of employees in 
the tertiary sector; (iv) decreasing in the rate of population growth from 2000 to 2003; (v) 
increasing with the starting level of population density; (vi) increasing in the quality of 
government indicator; (vii) increasing in the percentage of the population with higher 
education levels. It is reassuring that these variables, which have a theoretical rationale, are 
found to have a statistically significant influence on economic developments3. 
As a robustness check, we included R&D personnel as a share of total employment, with 
statistically significant estimates. When including this variable, the percent of the population 
with higher education levels lost its statistical significance when using NUTS-2 data (columns 
 
3 Other variables, which were tested but were not significant, included business demographics, health 
indicators and a dummy for whether a region is rural. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.187 -0.284 -0.175 -0.189 -0.133 -0.222 -0.153 -0.166
(0.039) (0.041) (0.016) (0.016) (0.036) (0.036) (0.015) (0.015)
-6.298 -5.083 -4.893 -4.443 -3.996 -2.852 -1.997 -1.568
(1.012) (1.046) (0.59) (0.612) (0.955) (0.967) (0.457) (0.476)
-0.699 -0.563 -0.988 -0.960 -0.909 -0.782 -1.174 -1.150
(0.14) (0.133) (0.065) (0.065) (0.128) (0.12) (0.059) (0.059)
-2.297 -1.953 -1.366 -1.393 -1.926 -1.636 -0.869 -0.893
(0.619) (0.568) (0.228) (0.226) (0.563) (0.513) (0.213) (0.211)
0.404 0.379 0.263 0.258 0.313 0.294 0.265 0.260
(0.12) (0.075) (0.056) (0.055) (0.107) (0.069) (0.052) (0.051)
0.209 0.249 0.264 0.268 0.028 0.069 0.095 0.099
(0.084) (0.076) (0.04) (0.039) (0.081) (0.073) (0.036) (0.035)
0.524 0.132 0.571 0.418 0.589 0.251 0.677 0.544
(0.159) (0.164) (0.089) (0.095) (0.155) (0.158) (0.086) (0.092)
9.011 2.828 7.864 2.480
(1.735) (0.832) (1.574) (0.764)
2.569 3.380 2.531 2.644 2.224 2.960 2.454 2.554
(0.323) (0.332) (0.139) (0.135) (0.301) (0.299) (0.128) (0.124)
Observations  271  271 1341 1341  258  258 1289 1289
Adjusted R
2 0.55 0.59 0.51 0.52 0.61 0.65 0.56 0.57
Constant
Percentage from 25-64 with
tertiary education in 2003
R&D personnel in % of total
employment in 2003
Capital/output ratio in 2003
% of employment in tertiary
sector in 2003
Growth in population 2000-
2003
Population density in 2003
Quality of governance in 2010
Level of GDPpc PPS in 2003
28 EU member states, 
NUTS-2
28 EU member states, 
NUTS-3
27 EU member states 
without Greece, NUTS–2
27 EU member states 
without Greece, NUTS–3
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(2) and (6) of Table 1), but retained its significance when using NUTS-3 data (columns (4) 
and (8)). This result suggests that the larger number of observations and the consequent 
larger variation between NUTS-3 regions than between NUTS-2 regions allow the impact of 
a larger set of growth drivers to be uncovered. 
The residuals of our regressions correspond to the part of economic growth left unexplained 
by the variables we included, which we call ‘unexplained economic growth’. This 
corresponds to ‘extra growth’ in addition to the growth that would have been explained by 
the fundamental growth determinants we considered.  
The comparison of regional ranking according to actual economic growth (Figure 1) and 
unexplained economic growth (Figure 2) reveals major differences. For example, actual 
economic growth in most Italian regions was rather poor and thus most of Italy is in red on 
Figure 1. But part of this poor performance was the consequence of unfavourable 
fundamentals, since when we control for growth determinants, several Italian regions are in 
yellow (implying average performance) and some are even in green (implying good growth 
performance) in Figure 2. 
Bulgaria provides a contrary example: its actual growth performance was outstanding, as 
indicated by mostly green-coloured regions in Figure 1. But Figure 2, which shows 
unexplained economic growth, shows that some regions had average or poor growth 
performance. In other words, given the initial conditions of several Bulgarian regions, 
economic growth should have been faster than what actually happened. 
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Figure 1: Actual economic growth by NUTS-3 regions, 2003-2017 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: The figure shows the declines of GDP per capita at PPS growth in 
2003-17 in the EU. The ten deciles are discriminated by alternative colours and ordered from dark red 
(least growing decile) to dark green (fastest growing decile). 
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Figure 2: Unexplained economic growth by NUTS-3 regions, 2003-2017 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: The figure shows the declines of unexplained economic growth 
defined as the residual from regression (4) of Table 1. The ten deciles are discriminated by alternative 
colours and ordered from dark red (least growing decile) to dark green (fastest growing decile).  
 
Among the 1341 NUTS-3 regions included in regression (4) of Table 1, the top 134 regions 
comes from 23 countries, highlighting that there are rather successful regions, in terms of 
unexplained economic growth, in most EU countries. The unlucky group of 134 worst 
regions is from 16 countries, suggesting more concentration. In particular, 44 of the 52 
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Greek regions are in the bottom decile, three are in the second worst decile and two are in 
the third worst decile, highlighting that Greece suffered massively after 2008.  
Greece experienced a very different economic evolution during the period 2003-17 
compared to other EU countries because of the divergence in terms of macroeconomic 
fundamentals and the austerity measures implemented after the 2008 global financial crisis. 
These, in turn, had repercussions for the performance of each Greek local entity. For this 
reason, we re-estimated our models excluding Greece (third and fourth blocks of Table 1). 
Interestingly, quality of government loses its statistical significance when the sample does 
not include Greece when using NUTS-2 level data, but it is highly statistically significant 
when using NUTS-3 level data. This result again highlights the benefits of using a larger 
sample. Because of the particular circumstances of the Greek economic and social collapse 
after 2008, we use model (6) without Greece considering NUTS-2 data and model (8) 
without Greece considering NUTS-3 data as our baseline scenarios for further analysis. 
 
4 Learning from the project characteristics that could produce the best 
results 
In this section, we compare our estimates of unexplained economic growth with the 
regions’ cohesion policy project characteristics, in an attempt to uncover interesting 
patterns. Similarly to the difficulties in detecting causal patterns in literature, we cannot 
claim causality either, ie that certain cohesion project characteristics explain this extra 
growth. Other factors might be more important for growth development. For example, on 
the positive side, that the government attracted large foreign direct investment which 
boosted production and average productivity in the region; or on the negative side, that 
there was a major natural disaster. Nevertheless, it is instructive to analyse the best and 
worst performing regions in terms of the different characteristics of cohesion policy 
projects. We also discuss certain factors that could explain the associations we found. 
4.1 Methodology 
We conducted two types of analysis:  
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1. A correlation analysis across the whole EU, in which we considered all the regions 
simultaneously to see how their characteristics are correlated with unexplained 
economic growth, and 
2. A quartile analysis by country, in which we contrasted only the best and worst 
performers within each country, and then averaged the differences across the EU.  
Both approaches have a rationale. Correlation analysis of the full sample of regions can 
highlight patterns systematically over all regions of the EU. However, it is possible that the 
association between project characteristics and unexplained economic growth is stronger 
for the best and the worst performers, but less so for those regions which are in the middle 
of the growth distribution. Furthermore, country-specific characteristics can also play a role. 
Therefore, in our second analysis we calculated the difference in project characteristics of 
the best and worst performing regions for each country, and then averaged these country-
specific differences across the EU. Since countries differ in terms of the number of NUTS-2 
regions, we considered only those EU countries that have at least four NUTS-2 regions. We 
considered the top quartile of regions to be the best performers and the bottom quartile of 
regions to be the worst performers in terms of unexplained economic growth4. As a 
robustness check, we analysed NUTS-3 regions where data is available. 
4.2 Project characteristic data 
The publicly available data on project characteristics can be grouped essentially into three 
categories: payments by EU fund, interregional project characteristics and summary project 
characteristics (including sectoral breakdown). 
Payments by fund to each region are available via the DG REGIO Data for research platform 
(https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/data-for-research/) under the 
name ‘Historic EU payments – regionalised and modelled’5. The 2014-2020 cohesion funds 
are split between the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF, 55 percent of total 
cohesion spending), the European Social Fund (ESF, 23 percent), the Cohesion Fund (CF, 20 
percent) and the Youth Employment initiative (1 percent). The European Agricultural Fund 
 
4 That is, when a country has four NUTS-2 regions, then only the best and the worst regions are considered, but 
when, for example, a country has 12 NUTS-2 regions, we consider the top three and the bottom three regions. 
5 See https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/Other/Historic-EU-payments-regionalised-and-modelled/tc55-7ysv.  
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for Rural Development (EAFRD) is part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), but since 
the EAFRD has a regional focus, we also considered this fund in our analysis. EAFRD is also 
part of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), along with the ERDF, ESF, CF 
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)6. 
On project characteristics, however, readily available public data at regional level is scarce. 
The European Commission aggregates data at programme level, not allowing for detailed 
regional comparisons. We therefore used two datasets, which we refer to as the 4P dataset 
and the interregional database. Neither is complete in its coverage of projects, but both 
provide different insights into project characteristics conducive to analysis of unexplained 
economic growth. 
One data source, which we designate the ‘4P dataset’, comes from the European 
Commission Regional Policy website (https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/), 
where up to four projects per NUTS-2 region are listed and explained in detail. These same 
projects can be found by accessing https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/projects, where it 
states “This is a list of representative projects funded by ESIF. It is not an exhaustive list of all 
projects”. We have to presume that the sample is indeed representative of projects, even 
though it is not representative of the funds: of the 606 projects listed, 504 are funded by the 
ERDF, 51 by the CF, 11 by the ESF, and two by the pre-accession instrument, while the fund 
is not indicated for 38 projects7. However, as long as the criteria for selecting projects is not 
related to the characteristics analysed, or to unobservables that affect unexplained 
economic growth, the correlations should still convey significant information8. The 606 
projects refer to the 2007-2013 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) period and their 
combined budget amounts to 3.2 percent of the total ESIF budget in 2007-2013, a relatively 
low share. 
The other dataset, which we designate as the ‘interregional dataset’ 
(https://www.keep.eu/), contains projects from interregional programmes from the ERDF. 
 
6 Information about ESIF: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-
programmes/overview-funding-programmes/european-structural-and-investment-funds_en.  
7 While there are 606 unique projects in this dataset, many of them are interregional and thereby altogether 
there are 896 project+region pairs. In our analysis we consider an interregional project for each region it 
targets. 
8 This argument is analogous to the justification of the use of instrumental variables in econometrics.  
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These include cross-regional initiatives (within a country) and international initiatives. We 
focus on data from the 2007-2013 period, for which the database includes 10,089 projects 
in total, corresponding to 94 percent of the total number of interregional projects under the 
ERDF in this programming period – thus its coverage is almost complete.  
It should be noted that these two datasets relate to different sets of projects. The 
interregional dataset covers only projects that involved interregional cooperation and that 
were ERDF-funded, while the 4P dataset covers projects from all ESIF funds (even though it 
is dominated by the ERDF, as we noted above), and these projects can be of any type, either 
region specific or interregional. Thus, findings might not necessarily point in the same 
direction. See the annex for the definition of the variables we were able to construct from 
these sources.  
4.3 Correlation analysis 
Fund type 
It is first important to highlight that cohesion policy commitments remain tied to the level of 
regional development. For example in the 2014-2020 programming period, on average, less-
developed regions (with GDP per capita at PPS below 75 percent of the EU average) 
received 1.61 percent of regional nominal GDP, transition regions (GDP per capita at PPS 
between 75 percent and 90 percent of the EU average) received 0.31 percent of GDP, while 
more developed regions (with GDP per capita at PPS over 90 percent of the EU average) 
received only just 0.07 percent as a share of GDP from ERDF and ESF combined. 
Furthermore, only countries with GDP per capita below 90 percent of the EU average are 
eligible for Cohesion Fund payments, which further increases the amounts received by less-
developed and transition regions, by on average 0.53 percent of GDP. 
Given the low amounts as a share of GDP, it is unlikely that EU cohesion funds have a 
material impact on GDP growth in more developed regions. Therefore, as a robustness 
analysis, we studied the association between unexplained economic growth and project 
characteristics by excluding more developed regions. We found that our results are robust.  
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Table 2 shows that the funding received by a region under the Cohesion Fund is highly 
statistically significant when considering the correlation with a region’s unexplained 
economic growth, with the correlation being positive. The absolute value of the amount 
paid into a region had a correlation of 0.272 with unexplained economic growth when all 
regions are considered, and 0.349 when developed regions are excluded. In contrast, the 
point estimate of the correlation coefficient is negative for the other three funds, though 
only marginally significant in the case of the ESF. A possible explanation for these results for 
the other three funds could be their more diverse goals, including environmental protection 
and social inclusion, which might not immediately lead to faster economic growth. 
 





ERDF -0.058 -0.135 
  (0.359) (0.202) 
ESF -0.117 -0.179 
  (0.063) (0.090) 
CF 0.272 0.349 
  (0.011) (0.004) 
EAFRD -0.026 -0.129 
  (0.676) (0.230) 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: Correlation coefficient refers to the estimated correlation 
between unexplained economic growth and funds received in euros at the NUTS-2 level (NUTS-3 level 
data is not available). The p-value is reported in brackets, which shows the probability of finding the 
observed (or larger in absolute terms) correlation coefficient when it is actually zero. Thereby, a low 
p-value indicates evidence for a non-zero correlation coefficient. Bold numbers indicate estimates 
which have a p-value below 0.1, that is, which are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Interregional projects 
Although the funds received under the ERDF as a whole are not statistically associated with 
unexplained economic growth, projects under the interregional umbrella do appear to be 
correlated. Table 3 shows how the total number of interregional projects and estimates of 
how much budget goes into the region correlate positively with the region’s unexplained 
economic growth. The estimated correlation coefficients are statistically larger than in all 
samples: with and without developed regions, and at both NUTS-2 and NUTS-3 levels. Table 
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3 also shows that participation in interregional projects matters more than their leadership: 
the three indicators related to leadership of interregional projects are generally not 
statistically significantly correlated with unexplained economic growth, only three of the 
twelve correlation coefficient estimates are statistically significant. Interregional projects 
might foster the cooperation and knowledge exchange between various regions, which 
might explain their positive contribution. 
By distinguishing between international (connecting regions from different countries) and 
national (connecting two or more regions from the same country) interregional projects, we 
find that only international interregional projects are positively, and in a statistically 
significant way, associated with better economic performance. Both the budget and the 
number of such projects are positively related to growth in all four alternative samples 
included in Table 3. In contrast, the budget of purely national projects is never significantly 
associated with better economic performance, and in some specifications the direction of 
association is even negative, while the number of national projects is significant in only one 
of the four cases. 
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Table 3: Correlation between unexplained economic growth and various indicators related 
to interregional funds 
 All regions 
Without developed 
regions 
  NUTS-2 NUTS-3 NUTS-2 NUTS-3 
Estimated INTERREG budget 0.116 0.135 0.214 0.155 
(0.063) (0.000) (0.042) (0.001) 
Number of INTERREG projects 0.127 0.124 0.198 0.120 
(0.041) (0.000) (0.060) (0.010) 
Estimated INTERREG budget from 
projects where the region is the lead 
partner 
0.051 0.104 0.135 0.151 
(0.431) (0.004) (0.213) (0.006) 
Number of INTERREG projects where 
the region is the lead partner 
0.035 0.073 0.054 0.058 
(0.594) (0.044) (0.618) (0.293) 
Proportion of projects where the region 
is the lead partner 
-0.051 0.021 -0.150 0.085 
(0.430) (0.572) (0.166) (0.125) 
Estimated INTERREG budget for 
international projects 
0.114 0.134 0.236 0.143 
(0.074) (0.000) (0.029) (0.003) 
Estimated INTERREG budget for 
national projects 
0.257 -0.131 0.214 -0.134 
(0.419) (0.337) (0.729) (0.504) 
Number of international INTERREG 
projects 
0.125 0.121 0.211 0.118 
(0.045) (0.000) (0.045) (0.011) 
Number of national INTERREG projects 0.035 0.054 -0.047 0.034 
(0.578) (0.075) (0.660) (0.466) 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: Correlation coefficient refers to the estimated correlation 
between unexplained economic growth and various indicators related to interregional funds (as 
indicated in the row labels). The p-value is reported in brackets; see its explanation in the note to 
Table 2. 
 
Most likely, resorting to long-distance partnerships might bring about efficiency gains for 
project design, procedures and implementation. In order to engage in cross-border 
cooperation, partners probably consider more ambitious and far-reaching projects, since 
otherwise the extra administrative burden to work together with entities from other 
countries might not be worthwhile. Cross-border cooperation potentially provides fruitful 
knowledge transfers, which could be valuable both between regions at similar levels of 
development and between regions with different levels of development, thereby helping 
less-developed regions to learn from their luckier peers. Importantly, projects involving 
partners from two or more different countries could be less likely to be prone to corruption 
and waste of resources, as institutions and businesses find themselves outside their usual 
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network of relationships and in new, unfamiliar environments, where playing by the rules 
could be the safest and most rational choice. 
Summary project characteristics 
One of the strongest positive associations is between unexplained economic growth and the 
proportion of projects managed at national level (as opposed to regional and local levels; 
Table 4). This might be because of relatively weak local institutions in countries with more 
room for convergence (eg eastern countries), where central ministries possibly are better at 
absorbing and managing EU funds. At the same time, national entities might be more able 
to identify and prioritise projects with the greatest potential. 
Regions with a higher proportion of projects whose primary beneficiary is a private company 
also perform better. This might be because projects targeting companies are more return-
driven and can unlock economic growth, but it might simply be a sign of regions with more 
positive growth prospects – where more companies exist and thus apply for funds. In our 
models of unexplained economic growth, we tried to control for business demographics 
(such as birth and death rates of businesses, the population of active enterprises, and 
employees in the population of active enterprises), and found it not to be a significant 
factor.  
Regions with higher proportions of projects whose primary beneficiary is a non-research 
NGO also perform better, but only when the full sample is used. When we restrict the 
sample to less-developed and transition regions, the correlation coefficient is no longer 
significant. The positive association with non-research NGOs could suggest that such 
beneficiaries might be able to mobilise local participants. It is important to highlight that the 
share of public-sector beneficiaries is not associated with better growth outcomes. 
Duration in the 4P dataset is strongly positively associated with unexplained economic 
growth, potentially hinting at the positive effects of taking a longer-term view of 
investments. The result for longer-duration projects suggests that more strategic projects 
could bring benefits. 
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We find a strong negative association between the national co-financing rate and 
unexplained economic growth, with a -0.217 correlation coefficient for all regions and -
0.290 for the subsample without regions. That is, regions with higher national co-financing 
rates tend to grow less. This finding might be explained by the availability of funding: when 
the national co-financing rate is low, national authorities might have more resources to 
spend on other projects, which might stimulate growth. 
Table 4: Correlation between unexplained economic growth and summary project 
characteristics (4P dataset), NUTS-2 regions 




National management proportion 0.313 0.427 
  (0.000) (0.000) 




Number of managing authorities 0.044 0.002 
  (0.513) (0.987) 
Public beneficiary proportion 0.027 0.032 
  (0.683) (0.764) 
Private beneficiary proportion 0.187 0.215 
  (0.004) (0.043) 
Academia beneficiary proportion -0.020 0.064 
  (0.755) (0.550) 
NGO beneficiary proportion 0.115 -0.023 
  (0.079) (0.829) 
Number of beneficiaries -0.013 -0.059 
  (0.852) (0.592) 
Duration 0.204 0.292 
  (0.002) (0.007) 
National co-financing -0.217 -0.290 
  (0.001) (0.006) 
Number of related themes -0.044 -0.013 
  (0.500) (0.907) 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: Correlation coefficient refers to the estimated correlation 
between unexplained economic growth and various indicators related to project characteristics from 
the 4P dataset (as indicated in the row labels). The p-value is reported in brackets; see its explanation 
in the note to Table 2. 
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Sectoral breakdown of projects 
In terms of the association of sectors with unexplained economic growth, no clear patterns 
emerge and the results are conflicting when using the two alternative datasets for project 
characteristics (Table 5). The estimated correlation coefficients are rarely significant, and 
when this is the case for a particular sample, the coefficient is not significant for other 
samples. Perhaps the strongest association is with the transport sector for which three of 
the six samples resulted in statistically significant positive correlation coefficients, yet the 
other three samples resulted in insignificant estimates. Somewhat surprisingly, business 
support is negatively associated with unexplained economic growth in the interregional 
dataset, but such estimates are insignificant for the 4P dataset. Three of the six estimates 
for environment are significantly positive, but not the other three, of which two even have 
negative point estimates. For the other sectors, estimates are not significant and often the 
sign of the point estimate differs for the two datasets. These findings suggest that the sector 
of intervention is probably less relevant for economic growth. 
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Table 5: Correlation between unexplained economic growth and sector breakdown of 
projects 
 All regions Without developed regions 
 4P Interregional 4P Interregional 
  NUTS-2 NUTS-2 NUTS-3 NUTS-2 NUTS-2 NUTS-3 
Environment -0.089 0.137 0.209 -0.101 0.063 0.044 
  (0.175) (0.028) (0.047) (0.346) (0.038) (0.347) 
Innovation 0.017 -0.060 0.005 0.053 -0.040 -0.039 
  (0.791) (0.340) (0.963) (0.624) (0.185) (0.402) 
ICT 0.026 -0.149 -0.235 -0.027 -0.071 -0.117 
  (0.689) (0.017) (0.025) (0.805) (0.019) (0.012) 
Territorial cohesion 0.009 0.005 0.148 -0.039 0.019 0.040 
  (0.888) (0.932) (0.160) (0.713) (0.536) (0.396) 
Urban development 0.026 -0.011 0.031 0.013 -0.022 0.059 
  (0.697) (0.861) (0.773) (0.901) (0.474) (0.206) 
Rural development 0.078 -0.090 -0.150 0.044 -0.037 -0.051 
  (0.234) (0.150) (0.157) (0.682) (0.220) (0.279) 
Business support 0.049 -0.221 -0.205 -0.021 -0.116 -0.117 
  (0.453) (0.00) (0.051) (0.843) (0.000) (0.012) 
Education & training 0.055 0.071 -0.074 0.026 0.016 -0.031 
  (0.404) (0.259) (0.483) (0.806) (0.594) (0.512) 
Transport 0.164 -0.065 0.053 0.298 0.000 0.096 
  (0.012) (0.296) (0.621) (0.005) (0.996) (0.040) 
Energy & infrastructure 0.051 -0.029 0.090 0.017 0.032 0.038 
  (0.435) (0.642) (0.396) (0.875) (0.296) (0.422) 
Social inclusion 0.001 -0.023 -0.061 -0.078 -0.026 -0.018 
  (0.992) (0.716) (0.565) (0.465) (0.396) (0.703) 
Tourism & culture -0.077 0.114 0.020 -0.113 0.050 -0.001 
  (0.238) (0.068) (0.851) (0.290) (0.101) (0.981) 
Health 0.013 0.002 -0.021 -0.045 -0.001 -0.029 
  (0.849) (0.970) (0.845) (0.676) (0.962) (0.540) 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: Correlation coefficient refers to the estimated correlation 
between unexplained economic growth and percentage of projects, which include the sector listed on 
the row labels among its related themes. The p-value is reported in brackets; see its explanation in 
the note to Table 2. 
 
4.4 Quartile analysis  
It is useful to complement our analysis by focusing on the differences between the best and 
worst performers, in terms of unexplained economic growth, from each country. The 
association between project characteristics and unexplained economic growth could be 
stronger for the best and the worst performers, but less so for those regions in the middle 
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of the growth distribution. Country-specific characteristics could also play a role. Therefore, 
in this section, we calculate the differences in terms of the project characteristics of the best 
and worst performing regions for each country, and then average these country-specific 
differences across the EU. Thus, any eventual idiosyncratic country-specific factor is 
eliminated. 
We consider only those EU countries that have at least four NUTS-2 regions and regard the 
best performers as those in the top quartile of regions and the worst performers as those in 
the bottom quartile of regions, in terms of unexplained economic growth. In principle, these 
results could be at odds with the correlations that include all regions, as reported in section 
4.3, because they only refer to less than half of the total sample and, by design, do not 
consider the dynamics within the middle of the distribution. However, in practice our results 
are very much in line with the simple correlation analysis (Table 6), suggesting the 
robustness of our results. 
The most robust characteristics suggest that the best performing regions have, on average, 
projects with: 
(i) Longer durations,  
(ii) More inter-regional focus, 
(iii) A higher proportion of private sector or non-research NGOs or academic entities 
among the beneficiary entities (as opposed to public-sector entities), 
(iv) A higher share of funding from the Cohesion Fund, 
(v) A higher share of EU co-financing.  
We do not include the share of national vs. regional/local management of projects in this 
analysis, because in several countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Netherlands and Portugal) there is very little within-country variability in this indicator. The 
exclusion of these countries from the analysis, along with the exclusion of those countries 
that have fewer than four NUTS-2 regions, eliminates most of the observations. Hence, for 
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the analysis of national vs. regional/local management of projects, we only rely on the 
correlation analysis presented in section 4.3. 
Similarly to the correlation analysis of Section 4.3, no clear patterns emerge for the sectors 
of intervention and the results are conflicting when using the two alternative datasets for 
project characteristics9. 
Table 6: Differences in project characteristics between the first and the last quartiles of 
regions by country concerning unexplained economic growth 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: we first calculate differences of the project characteristics of the 
best and worst performing regions for each country, and then average these country-specific 
differences across the EU. 
 
5. Summary and policy implications 
The academic literature on the effectiveness of European Union cohesion policy is 
inconclusive and there are major problems with earlier methodologies, and in particular, 
with the analysis of causality. Additionally, while many papers focused on the overall impact 
of cohesion policy, very few works have looked at the characteristics of cohesion projects. 
 
9 Detailed results are available from the authors on request. 
Funding from: ERDF interregional projects:
ERDF -0.18 Estimated INTERREG budget NUTS-2 0.13
ESF -0.10 Estimated INTERREG budget NUTS-3 0.65
CF 0.11 Number of INTERREG projects NUTS-2 0.14
EAFRD -0.42 Number of INTERREG projects NUTS-3 0.55
Estimated INTERREG budget from projects where 
the region is the lead partner NUTS-2
0.01
4P dataset: Estimated INTERREG budget from projects where 
the region is the lead partner NUTS-3
0.42
Private beneficiary proportion 0.10 Number of INTERREG projects where the region is 
the lead partner NUTS-2
-0.08
NGO beneficiary proportion 0.48 Number of INTERREG projects where the region is 
the lead partner NUTS-3
0.22
Public beneficiary proportion -0.11 Proportion of projects where the region is the lead 
partner NUTS-2
0.32
Academia beneficiary proportion 0.51 Proportion of projects where the region is the lead 
partner NUTS-3
0.19
Duration 0.07 Duration NUTS-2 0.05
National co-financing -0.10 Duration NUTS-3 0.09
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We have therefore adopted a novel methodology that first estimated ‘unexplained 
economic growth’ by controlling for the influence of various region-specific factors, and 
then analysed its relationship with about two dozen characteristics specific to projects 
carried out in various regions in the context of EU cohesion policy. We found that the best-
performing regions have on average projects with longer durations, more inter-regional 
focus, lower national co-financing, more national (as opposed to regional and local) 
management, higher proportions of private or non-profit participants among the 
beneficiaries (as opposed to public-sector beneficiaries) and higher levels of funding from 
the Cohesion Fund. No clear patterns emerged concerning the sector of intervention. 
Our results have several implications for EU cohesion policy reform, of which we highlight 
four. 
First, the beneficial effects of longer duration are consistent with the importance of 
strategic focus in cohesion policy. Setting up long-term strategies and sticking to them in 
implementation seem to be important factors in the usefulness and effectiveness of 
cohesion that do not require high levels of flexibility. In contrast the adopted European 
Union budget for 2021-2027 includes various forms of flexibility, including moving resources 
between priorities, years or even between spending categories10.  
Second, one of the most robust findings from our study is the great potential of 
interregional projects to unlock growth. Yet only a limited share of EU cohesion policy 
projects connect regions: the total budget of such projects was just 4.8 percent of the ERDF 
spending in the 2007-2013 MFF, and hence we recommend allocating more for such 
projects. However, care must be taken to avoid divergent tendencies that can arise if more-
advanced regions are better able to engage in large-scale cooperation. Capacity building 
becomes crucial, in which fostering cooperation between more and less-developed regions 
plays a useful role. 
 
10 See the adopted 2021-2027 European Union budget at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/adopted-
mff-legal-acts_en. In general, flexibility within the EU budget can be useful to respond to unforeseen 
circumstances, such as the 2015 migration crisis. But our findings refute the need for high levels of flexibility 
within cohesion policy. 
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Third, our empirical finding which shows that higher national co-financing is associated with 
lower economic growth likely reflects the role of fiscal constraints after the 2008 global 
financial crisis, since higher national contributions leave less scarce public resources for 
other spending priorities. Yet in countries that do not face fiscal constraints, higher national 
co-financing might even lead to an increase in cohesion projects, because for a given 
amount of EU funding more national funding is added. Thus, the extent of fiscal constraints, 
or the lack of it, could be a factor in determining the co-financing rate11.  
And fourth, the importance of a locally-led perspective should be reconciled with our finding 
of better centralised management. A possible way to do this would be to couple locally-led 
demand for projects, driven by more accurate knowledge of local needs and deficiencies, 
with higher-level allocation, oversight and management. Perhaps our empirical finding of 
weaker local management results from inadequate administrative capacity at local level – 
our econometric estimates also confirmed a statistically significant and robust relationship 
between economic growth and an indicator of institutional quality, which could reflect 
administrative capacity too. Hence, where administrative capacity is lacking, building proper 
expertise and structures should be a top priority. 
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A1 Data sources and adjustments for the regression analysis 
A1.1 Sources 
Eurostat is the largest provider of data for our analysis, as its regional database12 contains a 
number of useful indicators at NUTS-1, NUTS2 and NUTS-3 levels13. We gathered NUTS-2 
data, but we also collected some NUTS-3 statistics. We used data from several Eurostat 
databases: (i) regional economic accounts, (ii) regional demographic statistics, (iii) regional 
education statistics, (iv) regional science and technology statistics, (v) regional business 
demography, (vi) regional labour market statistics. We also include a Quality of Government 
Index at NUTS-2 level compiled by the Government Institute of Gothenburg University, 
referring to its last (2017) edition. Finally, we create a variable on the capital to output ratio 
at NUTS-2 level. At times, we constructed occasionally missing data at NUTS-2 level in a 
sensible way that we describe case by case in the following section. 
A1.2 Adjustments 
A few observations are missing for some variables of interest in specific years (the actual 
number of missing observations for each variable is listed in the relevant sections).  
In general, we extrapolate missing values through the procedure described below.  
If we lacked the data for a NUTS ‘x’ unit, but we have values for the ‘parent’ NUTS ‘x-1’ unit, 
we applied the same observed trend, or, if missing, the value itself, to the unit of interest. 
The Danish case provides a suitable example: data on population density is available only for 
Denmark as a whole (and for its single NUTS-1 region). Data for its NUTS-2 (NUTS-3) regions 
is available from 2005 (2006) onwards. We calculated the percentage change from 2005 to 
2003 for Denmark, and applied it backwards across NUTS-2 regions to derive their 2003 
value. As we have 2006 data for NUTS-3 regions, we calculated the percentage change for 
each NUTS-2 unit from 2006 to 2003 values (previously derived) and applied it to the 
 
12 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions/data/database. In subsequent footnotes we list the Eurostat 
codes for the specific datasets. 
13 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing 
up the economic territory of the EU. See: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background. 
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belonging NUTS-3 regions. This way, we obtained reasonable estimates for our missing 
observations. 
Sometimes the opposite is true, and we have data for NUTS-3 (2) regions but not for the 
overarching NUTS-2 (1) region. In such cases, it was usually simpler to aggregate (by 
summing or averaging, according to the specific variable) the underlying values.  
Finally, some regions have been recoded from NUTS 2013 to NUTS 2016 classifications. For 
instance, the Hungarian NUTS-2 region Közép-Magyarország was discontinued and split into 
Budapest and Pest megye. Values were divided (in case of sums) or directly applied (in case 
of shares) to the two new regions. We have applied the same procedure to other similar 
cases.  
A1.3 Regional economic accounts 
We focused on Gross Domestic Product data by NUTS-2 region in purchasing power 
standards (PPS) per inhabitant from 2000 to 201614, and we operated a logarithmic 
transformation. We then considered the level of this variable in 2003 and the difference 
between 2015 and 2003 levels (i.e. the percentage growth of GDP per capita in PPS over the 
12-year period).  
A1.4 Regional demographic statistics  
We used the average annual population by NUTS-2 region (the same statistics that Eurostat 
uses to calculate per capita variables)15 and the population density by NUTS-2 region16. The 
former serves as a basis for the population growth variable that we have constructed for the 
period 2000-2003. The latter shows 172 missing observations for 2003. We have generated 
them via different procedures: if data was available for (i) previous and/or subsequent years 
for the same NUTS-2 region and for (ii) the corresponding NUTS-1 region, we calculated the 
percentage change in the NUTS-1 region for the same time span and applied it to the NUTS-
2 level. Other tailored remedies included the imposition of the same trend observed in 






A1.5 Regional education statistics 
We used the database on educational attainments, and in particular we concentrated on (i) 
the percentage of population aged 25-64 with upper secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary 
and tertiary education (corresponding to levels 3 to 8 by international educational 
standards), (ii) the percentage of population aged 25-64 with tertiary education (levels 5 to 
8)17 and (iii) the percentage of population aged 18-24 which received neither formal nor 
non-formal education or training in the last four weeks preceding the survey by NUTS-2 
region18. 28 observations were missing for the first two indicators. We followed the same 
procedure as in the previous case to replace them with sensible constructions.  
A1.6 Regional science and technology statistics 
We used statistics on the percentage of total personnel and researchers in research and 
development (in full-time equivalent, FTE) over total employment by NUTS-2 region19. In 
order to estimate the 140 missing observations in 2003, we followed the usual procedure.  
Data on patent applications by NUTS-2 region20 is available only starting from 2008 and 
could be used at a later stage to assess the overall economic trends, also in terms of 
technological innovation and productivity.   
We also used data on the percentage of total employment in services, available until 200821, 
to integrate our series on sectoral employment from the regional labour market statistics.  
A1.7 Regional business demography 
All regional business demography statistics - birth and death rates of businesses, population 
of active enterprises and employees in the population of active enterprises, by sector22 -, 
start from 2008 and are used to analyse the impact of the evolution of the economic 







22 Considered for industry, construction and services sectors together and individually from EUROSTAT dataset 
[bd_hgnace2_r3]. 
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A1.8 Regional labour market statistics 
We used data on the percentage of long-term unemployed (12 months and more) in the 
active population by NUTS-2 region23 and on the evolution of the composition of 
employment by sector by NUTS-2 region24. This data is available from 2008 on and therefore 
has been integrated with the series from the regional science and technology statistics. As 
the definition of sectors has changed, numbers exhibit some variation from one series to 
another. However, the simultaneous presence of 2008 values in both series allowed us to 
estimate a transformation coefficient (assumed fairly constant) that we used to build an 
integrated time series spanning 2000 to 2016. We focused on the share of employment in 
the tertiary sector in 2003 and on its evolution from 2003 to 2015.  
A1.9 Quality of government Index 
The World Bank provides a Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) yearly report at country 
level. However, for our analysis, a more granular evaluation would provide immense added 
value. This is why we turned to the European Quality of Government Index, developed by 
the Quality of Government Institute of Gothenburg University, since it is the most local set 
of such indicators available (NUTS-2 level). The index contains separate and integrated 
evaluations of a region’s perceived corruption, along with its impartiality and quality in its 
provision of public services. Three editions of the survey have been published so far (in 
2010, 2013 and 2017), and we relied on the first for our starting analysis. 
A1.10 Capital to output ratio 
For our analysis, it is crucial to grasp the local availability of physical capital in order to test 
more accurately each region’s relative starting conditions and assess each region’s 
performance accordingly. A measure of capital to output ratio is not available for regions 
and therefore we had to construct one, given the data at our disposal.  
AMECO provides data on the Net Capital Stock per country at 2010 prices, but not at 
purchasing power standards. The database also includes a price deflator, along with a 





prices using the deflator to make it consistent with the NUTS-2 level current price GDP data. 
We use the country-wide data to derive a NUTS-2 measure of the capital to output ratio by 
allocating by region the national stock of capital. The allocation is based on DG Regio 
statistics on gross fixed capital formation at NUTS-2 level in 1995-2003. Therefore, we 
calculated an ‘investment key’ by NUTS-2 region, which is each region’s share of the 
country’s gross fixed capital formation. We then multiplied the national net stock of capital 
by this investment key, to obtain a NUTS-2-specific net capital stock, and divided the 
resulting figure by each NUTS-2 region’s output. This provided us with an estimate of each 
region’s capital-output ratio. Crucially, the sum of regional capital stock over the sum of 
regional output coincides with the national capital-output ratios contained in the AMECO 
database, reassuring us about the consistency of this procedure.  
 
 
A2 Robustness of growth regression estimates to the choice of the dependent variable 
The dependent variable in our baseline regressions is per capita GDP at current market 
prices measured at purchasing power standards. This means that the change in this 
indicator from 2003 to 2017 includes the same EU-wide inflation over this period (as 
reflected in the change of EU-wide purchasing power standards) for every region, beyond 
region-specific real growth. Ideally, per capita GDP at constant market prices measured at 
purchasing power standards would be the best indicator, but unfortunately it is not 
available. However, for NUTS-2 regions, Eurostat publishes gross value added (GVA) at 
constant basic prices. For international growth comparison, GDP at market prices is a 
preferable indicator to GVA at basic prices. Nevertheless, as a robustness test, we use the 
change in per capita GVA at constant prices as an alternative dependent variable. Due to 
missing data, we had to exclude French, Irish and Maltese regions from the analysis and 
thus the number of observations is reduced from 271 to 246. 
Estimation results are very similar when using the two alterative dependent variables (Table 
A1), though the adjusted R2 of the regression is higher when we use GDP than when we use 
GVA as the dependent variable. 
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Table A1: Robustness of regression estimates to an alternative dependent variable 
 GDP GVA  GDP GVA 
Level of GDPpc PPS in 2003 
-0.185 -0.171  -0.294 -0.285 
(0.040) (0.043)  (0.041) (0.042) 
Capital/output ratio in 2003 
-5.957 -4.394  -4.669 -3.047 
(0.995) (0.968)  (1.012) (1.016) 
% of employment in tertiary 
sector in 2003 
-0.729 -0.416  -0.563 -0.242 
(0.140) (0.198)  (0.133) (0.180) 
Growth in population 2000-
2003 
-2.529 -2.180  -2.090 -1.721 
(0.677) (0.684)  (0.612) (0.594) 
Population density in 2003 
0.408 0.256  0.375 0.221 
(0.121) (0.148)  (0.074) (0.114) 
Quality of governance in 
2010 
0.233 0.245  0.275 0.290 
(0.087) (0.107)  (0.078) (0.095) 
Percentage from 25-64 with 
tertiary education in 2003 
0.481 0.556  0.062 0.119 
(0.163) (0.161)  (0.159) (0.149) 
R&D personnel in % of total 
employment in 2003 
     9.708 10.157 
 (1.753) (2.192) 
Constant 
2.555 1.983  3.458 2.928 
(0.335) (0.388)  (0.334) (0.392) 
Observations  246  246   246  246 
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.37  0.62 0.43 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Note: The dependent variable is either the growth rate of current 
market price per capita GDP at PPS in 2003-2017 (columns headed by GDP) or the growth rate of 
constant basic price per capita GVA in 2003-2017 (columns headed by GVA). Huber-White-Hinkley 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Bold estimates are statistically 
significant at 10% level. 
 
A3 Definition and sources of project characteristics variables 
Fund payments  
NAME DEFINITION SOURCE 
Payments Cohesion 
Fund/ERDF/EAFRD/ESF 
Total payments to the region 
under each of the funds 
DG REGIO Data for research, 
‘Historic EU payments - 




Project characteristics variables 
NAME DEFINITION SOURCE 
INTERREGIONAL 4P 
INTERREGIONAL PROJECTS FROM ERDF 
Estimated INTERREG budget Project budget estimated to 
have been allocated to the 
region25 
Y N 
Estimated INTERREG budget 
(leader) 
Project budget by region’s lead 
partner26 
Y N 
Number of INTERREG 
projects 
Number of projects per region 
part of INTERREG programmes 
Y N 
Number of INTERREG 
projects (leader) 
Number of projects per region 
part of INTERREG programmes 
in which the lead partner is in 
the region 
Y N 
Proportion of leadership Proportion of INTERREG 
projects in which the lead 
partner is the region 
Y N 
PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS 
Duration Average duration of projects 
(end date – start date) in the 
NUTS-2 region 
Y Y 
National co-financing Average percentage of funds 
provided by regional or national 




Average percentage of funds 
provided by regional or national 
entities across projects in which 
the region is the lead partner 
Y N 
Number of related themes Average number of themes 




Number of beneficiaries Average number of entities 




Average proportion of entities 




25 The interregional keep.eu database only has total budget at project level, not its breakdown by region. In 
order to approximate the regional breakdown, we assumed that the project’s budget is equally distributed 
between partners and we added up the budgets of each partner in a NUTS-2 region. For example, if 50 percent 
of a project’s partners are in a given NUTS-2 region, 50 percent of the project funds were assumed to be 
allocated to that region. 
26 The keep.eu database only has total budget at project level, not is breakdown by region. Under this variable, 
a project’s budget was allocated entirely to the region of the lead partner. It is therefore the total budget of 
projects in which the region is a lead partner.  
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NGO beneficiary proportion Average proportion of entities 
receiving funds which are non-
research NGOs 
N Y 
Public beneficiary proportion Average proportion of entities 
receiving funds which are part 




Average proportion of entities 
receiving funds which are 
primarily research institutions 
N Y 
MANAGING AUTHORITIES 
Number of managing 
authorities 
Average number of authorities 
managing a project 
N Y 
National proportion Average proportion of 
managing authorities which are 
national ministries 
N Y 
Non-national proportion Average proportion of 
managing authorities which are 
regional/local (including 




Overall Proportion in 
environment/innovation/etc. 
Percentage of projects which 
have as one of the named 
themes 
environment/innovation/etc. 
(not mutually exclusive) 
Y Y 
First priority relative budget 
in 
Environment/Innovation/etc. 
Percentage of budget allocated 
to first priority (mutually 
exclusive) 
Y N 
First priority proportion in 
environment/innovation/etc. 
Percentage of projects which 
have as first thematic 
environment/ innovation/etc. 
(mutually exclusive) 
Y Y 
 
 
 
